Years Of Service

Secretary of Transportation Peter Buttigieg on the Hill

‘Years of Service’ … what a concept. In government, those working for Transportation, Commerce, Energy, etc. pride themselves on their ‘years of service’ for ten years, fifteen years, forty years. In industry we used to call that a JOB. The only government folks who have ‘years of service’ are military folks because they are IN SERVICE 24 hours a day, 365-¼ days a year.

In government vernacular, what is ‘years of service’ supposed to mean? Is it service to the American people? Or is it really service to government bureaucracy? We each know what it’s supposed to mean.

On September 5, 2023, the Committee of Oversight and Accountability (COA) requested Secretary of the Department of Transportation (SDOT), Peter Buttigieg appear to answer questions concerning, “… a series of aviation and rail safety failures. These failures indicate a recent and disturbing pattern of failures at the Department [of Transportation] placing the safety of Americans at risk.” The COA is investigating specific safety issues in Aviation and Rail from Buttigieg’s last three years as SDOT.

COA’s invitation to Buttigieg

To be honest, COA lawmakers are less concerned with ‘safety of Americans’ than getting ahead of the next major accident news cycle. What aviation insiders cynically call a ‘smoking hole’ may actually be smoking craters [plural], the aviation equivalent of Rail accidents seen in Ohio, Tennessee, and Missouri. Make no mistake, it’s coming. All the signs are there in neon lights. It’s just that Americans have been distracted by other national nonsense, so no one’s been looking at the sky.

The question is, will Buttigieg bring solutions to the Hill? On September 6th, Buttigieg said, “A government shutdown would send US travel ‘in the wrong direction’.” What?! So, that’s a big NO to the ‘solution’ question. Buttigieg was referring to the pending government shutdown where he was foisting blame on his political rivals. His priorities are political, not safety. Buttigieg, who opined about racist roads and ignored the supply chain; whose underlings pushed diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI); forced professionals to leave agencies, like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for mandates; and blocked doctors trying to protect their patients from vaccinations. Buttigieg can’t – won’t – be serious; he's a pedestrian bureaucrat at best. In government service, bureaucrats don’t improve safety or rock the boat. Instead, they wait for their choice job in the private sector.

If the COA wants to see what leads to safety issues, look around. Strikes, shortages and inexperience abound. Strikes are viewed as ‘workers-against-management,’ but are really ‘workers-against-their-own-best-interests.’ Take the UPS truckers’ strike where UPS truckers received a hefty pay raise. UPS truckers applauded union efforts, but they should’ve referred to Macroeconomics for the built-in dangers. There isn’t a singular UPS checking account; UPS’s budget is broken down departmentally. The pay raise will come from the UPS trucking operations’ fixed budget and be paid for by increasing layoffs. The company will consolidate less profitable routes or contract to outside truckers to save money.

It's the same with airline strikes; airline companies must find money somewhere, usually maintenance and training. If pilots or mechanics want raises, airlines can park aircraft, cut routes, deprive other airline employees of training, and pay. Less aircraft, less routes, then less need for pilots and mechanics.

What about scarce pilot and mechanic numbers? Some think shortages are a good thing – like a buyer’s market, but it’s a two-edged sword, at best. The industry hires pilots and mechanics with less experience at less pay; this lowers or stagnates industry pay scale averages used to determine pay raises. Bet you didn’t see that coming. Airlines’ hiring choices are limited, so they take what they can get. It’s even been suggested many of the new safety issues are the result of inexperienced pilots, mechanics, and air traffic controllers. Is there truth to this? If so, would the airlines admit there’s truth to it? Probably not.

B777 throwing sparks over Newark-Liberty airport

These COA hearings are important – not for political value – but for some urgently-needed attention to aviation safety issues usually ignored. Fortunately, the Inspector General’s office has been paying attention to what’s going on and what’s going wrong. Hopefully someone will listen. On the COA letter’s second page are bullets of aviation safety events, safety concerns that, along with others, demand attention and action from the FAA. For instance, a United Airlines (UAL) B777 departed Newark-Liberty on September 20, 2022, where amateur video showed engine parts ejected from the #1 engine; glowing debris rained down on a parking lot. What was ejected from the B777’s engine? No report from UAL found. What did the FAA find?

Page 2 of COA invitation with aviation bullets

Then on December 18, 2022, while departing Kahului Airport, UAL flight 1722 experienced what the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) described as a ‘miscommunication’ between the captain and first officer. The B777 became uncontrollable, lost 1300 feet of altitude in 17 seconds – from 2100 feet to 748 feet above the Pacific – before the pilots regained control. Did anybody clean the pilots’ seats?

An NTSB spokesperson said, “The widebody jet plunged in altitude shortly after takeoff, but the crew was able to recover before any harm was done.” What?! Before … harm was done?! How would NTSB know? Per NTSB incident report DCA23LA172, the UAL 1722 event, “… did not meet the requirements of Title 49 code of federal Regulations [CFR] Part 830.5.” In fact, it did. CFR § 830.5 Immediate Notification, assures the NTSB receives direct report of “(a) An aircraft accident or any of the following listed serious incidents occur: (1) Flight control system malfunction or failure.”

UAL 1722 flight path

This is what Safety complacency looks like. But there wasn’t a flight control system malfunction. Who said? Who determined the B777 did not suffer a flight control (elevators) malfunction or failure? The pilots? They weren’t qualified to determine cause.  With the B737-MAX accidents the NTSB did back flips with the trim and maneuvering characteristics augmentation system, but they shrugged their shoulders at UAL1722’s ‘dive to the ocean.’ Title 49 CFR Part 830.5(a)(1) was ignored. How did the NTSB determine harm? They didn’t. DCA23LA172 stated, “The NTSB learned of the event 2 months later and chose to open an investigation.” Why did UAL report UAL1722 after two months? The NTSB report’s answer: “… both the cockpit voice and flight data recorder durations had been exceeded. The investigation utilized flight crew statements and other records as information sources.”

NTSB Incident Report DCA23LA172

What ‘other records?’ What ‘information sources?’ NTSB has no data; no reliable inspection reports; no flight computer downloads – NOTHING – to conduct a rational incident investigation with. Instead, the NTSB trusted the two people who had the most to lose; the two people who dismissed the incident’s importance before flying an unsafe Extended Twin-Engine Operation – ETOPs – flight 2300 miles across the Pacific. The NTSB doesn’t employ experienced professionals, such as pilots, mechanics … or anyone with digital aircraft experience, qualified to speak to the aircraft’s safety. NTSB investigators can’t fathom what happened with UAL1722, so their actions were ignorant.

The UAL1722 event was indicative of how apathetic aviation safety has become. Airlines dismiss their own safety. The absence of FAA on-site surveillance is leading all aviation to perfect storms of disaster: the Smoking Craters. For two months, the UAL1722 event was an unreported aviation safety failure of epic proportions. Was worst case scenario considered? Was a special structural inspection performed for fuselage strains? Were the elevators internally damaged from aerodynamic stresses? Did UAL contact Boeing? Was the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Office or the FAA’s Aircraft Evaluation Group in Seattle contacted? When did UAL tell the FAA?

Secretary Buttigieg can’t answer these questions. Most bureaucrats can’t spell F-A-A, but Buttigieg is a responsibility absentee, like finding Waldo in a field of white and red stripes. The Assistant SDOT has been making calls for the FAA, standing in for SDOT for almost two years. Why? Why would SDOT’s Assistant cover for him? Does the Assistant SDOT cover the other four transportation modes for him? SDOT has ignored the FAA and put the agency on the back burner for over three years.

Biden finally nominated Michael Whitaker for the FAA Administrator job. Whitaker, a bureaucrat, has a history of FAA leadership, more than the last nominee who couldn’t answer basic aviation questions. The last Acting Administrator enabled mandate silliness and promoted the killer joke: DEI, the cultural decay responsible for the FAA’s indifference and any internal problems. DEI enabled industry’s indifference to safety in the absence of oversight and surveillance. More importantly, under recent watch the FAA’s International Organization for Standardization – ISO 9001 – qualification quietly expired, nullifying the FAA’s Quality Management System – QMS – and its internal auditing program.

No doubt Whitaker has challenges. FAA upper management (UM) complacency is locked in. Hopefully, Whitaker revives the FAA’s ISO 9001 and its self-evaluations; it’ll be a valuable tool to bring the FAA back from the ledge its dancing on. FAA’s UM created a lot of problems for rank and file: oversight skills are rusty; many of the veteran aviation safety inspector (ASI) workforce were forced into retirement; safety hotlines aren’t brought to satisfactory conclusions. The FAA lost its edge; self-improvements and self-evaluations have been crippled in an ever-changing complicated industry.

The conflicts for Mister Whitaker won’t be easy to overcome. He will get major pushback from ASIs who don’t want to return to the office. The ASI’s union usually attaches itself to Quixotic windmill fights, so they’ll side with ‘easy chair’ surveillance; with those who moved across the country from the office they’re assigned to; with those who expect financial assistance to drive to the office; even with those who prefer not to be seen onscreen during virtual meetings.

Which leads to the next hurdle: the years since many ASIs have been on-site at the certificate holders they oversee. UAL1722 showed how being ‘out of sight, really does mean being out of mind’. It’s now four years since FAA UM stopped ASIs from setting foot in a hangar, a cockpit, repair station, fuel farm, ramp, airport, foreign certificate holder, and operations control rooms. Have new hires finished their Level Three training on … anything? Does the FAA conduct enroute inspections anymore? What about foreign repair stations; when were they last inspected?

‘Years of Service’ … a pointless concept if not attached to integrity. With regards to the Department of Transportation, Safety is the key in all transportation modes. We foolishly place aviation first, putting Marine, Highway, Rail and Pipeline behind in the line, but they’re all equally important. If we don’t have an SDOT who understands the seriousness of the job and its responsibilities; the consequences of failure; the significance of safety; the gravity of preserving human life; then we as a travelling public are lost. At the risk of hurting people’s feelings, the aviation industry and the FAA need real leadership. My best wishes to Michael Whitaker. Save us from ignorance.