Atlas is About to Shrug

A statue of Atlas supporting the world

If you haven’t read Ayn Rand’s novel Atlas Shrugged, you’re missing out. The mythological Atlas, who failed to overthrow the Olympians in the Titans’ War, was punished by Zeus to hold up the heavens (often portrayed as holding up the Earth). Rand used this image as a metaphor for those who hold up – bear the weight of – American society with their creativity, products, and services, suddenly ‘shrugging’ off their unappreciated and illogically condemned responsibility and allowing America to, in a word, implode.

We’re living out Atlas Shrugged in aviation today. Government effectiveness – an oxymoron – is collapsing in upon itself. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has altered focus to the uselessness of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) as a hiring and as an Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI) replacement process. The FAA’s surrendering office space (while still paying for them) because they don’t realize CØVID ended. Furthermore, they dismissed a large percentage of their talent and expertise when they threatened to fire many brilliant regulatory specialists for not getting the CØVID vaꞓꞓine.

The result? The aviation industry … is failing; the FAA … is failing; the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) … is failing. Thus, aviation safety itself … is failing. Both agencies and industry certificate holders will fail from neglect – the FAA and NTSB internally, certificate holders externally. Contributing to these failures are many unqualified people who were hired because of DEI requirements.

What about the experienced FAA ASIs? When CØVID vaꞓꞓines were forced on FAA ASIs, many qualified professionals retired, quit, or re-entered the industry, to avoid being subjected to the CØVID vaꞓꞓine with their families. These CØVID mandates, unlawful and immoral, had consequences, which are now manifesting themselves in obvious ways by the knowledge vacuum that exists today.

FAA Webpage about DEI hiring

Which brings us back to DEI. In a nutshell, DEI is anti-merit – this means people aren’t hired for their talent, knowledge or experience, three qualities FAA ASIs and NTSB investigators need to be successful. Instead, people are hired for their gender or race – not exactly qualifying traits. FAA ASIs, NTSB investigators, and their management are safety-sensitive positions, while in industry specialty jobs like being a flight attendant, pilot, aircraft technician, air traffic controller, DEI hiring practices amount to ethical and safety violations, enormous failures that will lead to accidents and safety issues.

Just as in Ayn Rand’s novel, many of those who had the knowledge and experience, the responsibility of assuring aviation safety; those whose experience and knowledge should’ve been passed on to the next generation … are gone. Metaphorically speaking, Atlas is shrugging because the damage is ongoing. It takes about five to seven years for a newly hired FAA ASI replacement or NTSB investigator to grow into the job, to learn what must be done and how to do it, under experienced tutelage.

Those who pushed the mandates weren’t stupid; they knew what would happen within the ranks of government and in the military, that government management would respond by hiring replacements using DEI practices. Did driving out skilled inspectors and investigators affect those left behind? There are now fewer qualified inspectors per FAA office to properly certify applicant repair stations, air operators, schools, and international repair stations, while simultaneously training new-hired inspectors.

The response might be, “That doesn’t mean industry will fail.” But industry will fail … by attrition. Certificated businesses aren’t receiving adequate oversight; safety issues aren’t being resolved. Applicants are on long lists, waiting for attention. Delaying these applicants affects scheduled work accomplished on US-registered aircraft, engine overhauls, component overhauls. The FAA’s inability to properly certify, to oversee, to conduct surveillance, and to audit, leads to industry failure. The result? A glut of certificate applicants for air operators, repair stations, both domestic and international, who no longer have FAA ASIs to expedite the certificates or approval processes. Why? Because those who used to do these jobs are now in the private sector trying to push the application packages through inexperienced replacements, the same people who are not being trained by inspectors who are gone … and leaving. It’ll get worse, not better.

These applicants are trying to meet an industry need for the latest inspection techniques, technologies, and manpower. They’re business start-ups whose delays cost investors thousands in postponements and application costs. It’s important to understand that while the applicants and certificate holders just mentioned will lose money, every federal government employee will get paid every two weeks, which is why there’s no urgency. It’s called government complacency.

Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg, who required DEI hiring policies

In addition, it’s a domino principle. The delay of certification means workers can’t be employed, leading to established air operators, like major airlines, can’t get parts and services. Eventually, the traveling public pays higher prices for fewer opportunities to travel. Why? The Secretary of Transportation demanded all government employees take the CØVID vaꞓꞓine or be terminated. So … Atlas is shrugging.

ASIs now doing double the work training new ASIs, don’t give their own certificates the necessary attention. Less certificate oversight and regulatory management means airframe, powerplant, instrumentation and accessory manufacturers will suffer.

Is there a solution after the federal government crippled aviation? The FAA must create Designee positions for certifying businesses – no choice. Designees will be former FAA inspectors who know what’s needed to qualify various applicants for certification, e.g., approving manuals, generating auditing programs, qualifying inspectors and management personnel. Maybe Atlas won’t shrug. The FAA lost its way; it can’t perform the functions it had in the past. The new Designee program will free FAA ASIs to focus on surveillance and oversight after DEI hires have been weeded out. Industry will demand this.

There are pros and cons to this. The Con: Privatization isn’t optimum; it brings its own problems; government has always been better at impartiality. However, the government did this to itself. A Pro is present Designees are positive efforts; they bring years of experience and knowledge. They allow present FAA ASIs to focus on fewer certificates, raise efficiency … and SAFETY. Bring ‘em on.

What about the NTSB? Will they take aviation safety seriously? Are they having DEI problems as well? Examine the recent Alaska Airlines 1282 (AA1282) Investigative hearing between August 6th and 7th, a sample of wasted time and resources, dragged out for seven months. In the hearing slide show, Slide 6, Presentation Introduction, stated, “Photo documentation indicates left-hand MED plug closed sometime between September 18th and 19th 2023, without 4 retaining bolts installed.” 4 missing bolts? Found to have happened in 2003? What were they investigating for seven months?

NTSB Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 hearing

How shameful the NTSB Chairwoman decided “Boeing was a party to the investigation but was not a party to the investigative hearing.” Since when? NTSB investigations aren’t conducted this way; all parties are represented, despite media-induced public opinion. Each party member participates equally through the whole process; no one ostracized. A hearing’s purpose: The truth, no matter how unpopular it is. This hearing was the NTSB equivalent of shooting hog-tied fish in a barrel. It was biased; it violated established NTSB investigatory procedures.

NTSB Chairwoman answering trained NTSB investigators' questions for them

There are two reasons for this action. First: The NTSB used this hearing to shame Boeing, gag them, then use the NTSB board room to publicly humiliate them. No matter how incompetent Boeing’s chief executive officer looks, Boeing is comprised of professionals who do their jobs. They deserve respect.

NTSB Chairwoman taking Happy Snap with evidence normally secured for the NTSB laboratory

Second: To make the NTSB appear effective. Was this AA1282 investigation and hearing indicative of NTSB’s lack of professionalism? The NTSB’s AA1282 Flickr page showed only pictures of the NTSB Chairwoman – no one else – examining door frames, conducting interviews, taking notes. She then stood over the subject door in Oregon, which appeared to have fluttered lightly to earth, like an autumn leaf. It was so clean. Didn’t it get dirty after plummeting 16,000 feet to impact? Did it form a little crater? Who cleaned it? Whose unethical idea was that? Who wiped away evidence, such as metal shavings or incorrect grease, evidence that should’ve been preserved … just so the Chairwoman could have her photo-op? Finding evidence is not time for a ‘Happy Snap’. It’s evidence; treat it as such.

NTSB Chairwoman doing trained NTSB investigators' interviews for them

From viewing other AA1282 photos, the Chairwoman doesn’t trust her investigators to do their jobs. Why’s she taking notes and interfering with their doorframe examination? Why is she interviewing witnesses? Was she trained to do this? Does she have manufacturing experience? Structural experience? Why would an inexperienced manager be involved with an active investigation? Why can’t the NTSB be serious?

NTSB Chairwoman recording doorframe evidence normally accomplished by trained NTSB investigators

The NTSB was better than this. The transportation industry doesn’t need circuses, where Flickr pictures and degree titles distract from experience – like DEI does. Moreso, the NTSB has paraded PhDs in past accident reports. For what? PhDs mean nothing in aviation. Promoting aviation safety doesn’t require titles; it demands investigators who know what questions to ask; investigators who understand contractors, regulations, technical paperwork, auditing, maintenance, management, airline inspection responsibilities, and culture. Investigators don’t learn on the job; these skills should be inherent, experienced, with personal knowledge. With AA1282, did any NTSB investigators have manufacturing experience?

What, then, is the solution? Privatize accident investigations. Get accident investigating – in all modes – out of the government’s incompetent hands. Privatizing isn’t ideal, but anything is better than this silliness. Management is for support; they shouldn’t be investigating. Accident investigators should be picked for experience, not education. Common sense and root cause analysis must prevail over ego. There are plenty of former FAA inspectors who would be excellent investigators because of their experience.

The FAA has no excuses for allowing qualified investors and future certificate holders’ business applications processes to go stale; there will be consequences, fair and legal. The NTSB has no excuse for allowing accident investigations to be done incompetently; the consequences will be to the traveling public, innocent victims sacrificed to DEI hiring practices. They will all, the fools and the fooled, be guilty of killing aviation safety because of an emotional and ambiguous misinterpretation of the word ‘fair’.